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ABSTRACT 
Since the passage of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment) Act 1992, alleged offenders with intellectual disabilities alone 
have, in reality, fallen outside the ambit of the fitness to plead regime in New 
Zealand. The provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 specifically require 
that a person must be suffering from a "mental disorder" (as defined in the 
Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992) before a 
finding of "under disability" is possible. However, this definition is, at least 
in part, irrelevant to the procedural issue of fitness to plead. It also 
specifically excludes those with only an intellectual disability. The courts 
have included intellectually disabled offenders in the regime through a wide 
interpretation of the definition of "mental disorder", but this strategy has 
resulted in inappropriate dispositions of such offenders to psychiatric 
institutions. Two Bills currently before Parliament will, if passed into law, 
comprehensively overhaul the law in this area, and specifically introduce 
legislation aimed (for the purposes ofthis paper) at the "compulsory care" of 
intellectually disabled offenders. The question is whether the proposed 
legislation will provide the panacea to the ills of the current fitness to plead 
regime. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 11,970 words. 
I 
FITNESS TO PLEAD AND THE 
INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED 
DEFENDANT 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to consider the issue of fitness to plead in criminal 
proceedings, and to examine how the New Zealand courts have dealt with 
intellectually disabled defendants under the Criminal Justice Act 1985 ("the 
CJA85") and the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) 
Act 1992 ("the MH(CA T)A92 "). The focus of the research will be on the 
inability of the current system to take account of the needs of those having 
only an intellectual handicap and whether the Bills currently before 
Parliament will provide a panacea. The current regime relies heavily on the 
definition of "mental impairment" yet, conversely, clearly excludes a person 
suffering solely from an intellectual handicap. As a means of circumventing 
this legislative oversight, the courts have interpreted the term very widely to 
include intellectually disabled defendants. Although a relatively small 
number of accused people are found to be under disability, the potential 
impact on those persons is enormous. 
In 1994, new legislation was introduced to remedy the then obvious defects 
in the CJA85. Subsequently, the New Zealand Law Commission was 
instructed to report on the issue of community safety with regard to mental 
health and criminal justice issues. In its 1994 report the Commission made 
specific recommendations for change in this area. The 1994 amendment Bill 
did not proceed, the only amendment to date being that of 1999. 1 The two 
Bills currently before Parliament were introduced in 1999 and adopt many of 
the 1994 recommendations of the Law Commission. 
The pnmary legislation to be considered will be the CJA85 and the 
MH(CA T)A92, which between them cover the entire process and are 
responsible for the injustices outlined above. Ultimately, the aim of the 
research is to highlight the current problems and to critically analyse the 
reform Bills. 
Before embarking on a discussion of the current state of the fitness to plead 
regime, the historical development of the concept will be briefly outJined. 
The purpose is to explain how and why the fitness to plead regime developed 
and to highlight current reliance on what is fundamentally archaic law. First, 
however, the contrast between concepts of insanity2 and fitness to plead 
("under disability" in the terminology of the CJA85) wi11 be discussed The 
two concepts are closely related and often confused. Indeed early judicial 
considerations of fitness to plead included directions to the jury that clearly 
linked disability with insanity. 3 
2 
3 
This amendment made changes that aimed at greater involvement of family and 
whanau. It also replaced the term "intellectual handicap" with "intellectual 
disability" : MH(CAT)A92, s 4(e). 
Crimes Act 1961 , s 23 . 
See generally Don Grubin "What Constitutes Fitness to Plead?" [1993] Crim LR 
748. 
2 
A Insanity and Fitness to Plead 
Insanity as legally, rather than clinica1ly, defined is concerned with the 
psychiatric condition of the accused at the time of the offence. At trial the 
defendant may well be outside the parameters of a finding of disability, 
although it is theoretically possible that both concepts could apply. The issue 
of disability, on the other hand, arises at the time of the trial of the accused. 
Unlike the insanity defence, disability is a matter of procedural fairness, 
concerned primarily with the mental health of the accused at the time of the 
trial. The crux of a disability hearing is to investigate whether the accused is 
able to participate in a meaningful way in the trial, and in New Zealand does 
not allow for a deten11ination of the issue of guilt or innocence. 4 The powers 
of disposition available to the court in the case of both insanity and disability 
are broadly similar. Both involve the accused being made the subject of an 
order under sl 15 of the CJA85. In addition, the insanity defence begins from 
the premise that the accused is "presumed sane". There is no such 
presumption in the case of a disability hearing. Finally, a successful defence 
of insanity has the effect of exculpating the defendant, whereas a finding of 
disability may act to merely delay the trial of the substantive matter. 
4 But see the discussion on the reform Bills below. The new regime includes such a 
determination. 
3 
B Historical Development 
The concept of fitness to plead has its origins in medieval law. 5 At that time, 
conviction for a serious crime had consequences that went beyond the loss of 
liberty or capital punishment that could be inflicted upon a convicted person. 
As well as punishing the miscreant, the law also required that the person's 
property was automatically forfeited to the Crown. As a method of 
circumventing this collateral punishment on their families, an accused would 
often refuse to participate in the trial. In effect, this involved the accused 
remaining silent, in other words being "mute". In these circumstances a jury 
was empanelled to decide whether the accused was mute "of malice"6 or "by 
visitation of God". 
The latter situation developed into the modem concept of fitness to plead. In 
the United Kingdom, the judicial direction for fitness to plead hearings is 
epitomised by R v Pritchard,7 where Alderson B directed the jury on the 
three criteria for a finding of disability: 
5 
6 
7 
First, whether the prisoner is mute of malice or not; secondly, whether he 
can plead to the indictment or not; thirdly whether he is of sufficient intellect 
to comprehend the course of proceedings on the trial, so as to make a 
proper defence - to know that he might challenge any of you to whom he 
may object - and to comprehend the details of the evidence, which in a case 
of this nature must constitute a minute investigation. 
See generally Warren Brookbanks "A Contemporary Analysis of the Doctrine of 
Fitness to Plead" [1982] NZ Recent Law 84. 
Crimes Act 1961, s 3 56(2) deals with situations where a defendant "wilfully refuses 
to plead", the modern equivalent of"mute of malice" . 
R v Pritchard (1836) 7 CAR & P 303; 173 ER 135. 
4 
C The Current New Zealand Regime 
The Pritchard test is still used in the United Kingdom, and it forms the basis 
of the New Zealand regime. In New Zealand the law centres upon section 
108 of the CJA85: 
108. Interpretation - (1) For the purposes of this Part of this Act, a person 
is under disability if, because of the extent to which that person is mentally 
disordered that person is unable-
(a) To plead; or 
(b) To understand the nature or purpose of the proceedings; 
or 
(c) To communicate adequately with counsel for the purposes of 
conducting a defence. 
(2) ... 
Section 108 is limited in its application, as there can be no disability finding 
in respect of minor offences. The relevant offence must be "punishable by 
imprisonment", as set out in section 111 of the CJA85:8 
111. Procedure- (1) In any case where a defendant who is charged with an 
offence punishable by imprisonment or death appears to be under disability 
and the Judge is satisfied on the evidence of 2 medical practitioners that the 
defendant is mentally disordered, the Judge shall , after giving the 
prosecution and the defendant an opportunity to be heard and to call 
evidence on the matter, determine whether the defendant is under disability. 
Of crucial importance in both sections is the term "mentally disordered". This 
term is not defined in the CJA85, but the dispositions available to those 
under disability specifically refer to the MH(CAT)A92. In view of this 
8 See generally Warren Brookbanks, "Judicial Determination of Fitness to Plead - The 
Fitness Hearing" (1992) 7 Otago LR 520. 
5 
interdependence, the established practice of the courts has been to rely on the 
definition of "mental disorder" contained in section 2 of the MH(CAT)A92. 
Here "mental disorder" is defined as: 
.. . an abnonnal state of mind (whether of a continuous or an intermittent 
nature), characterised by delusions, or by disorders of mood or perception 
or volition or cognition, of such a degree that it-
(a) Poses a serious danger to the health or safety of that 
person or of others; or 
(b) Seriously diminishes the capacity of that person to take 
care of himself or herself;-
and "mentally disordered", m relation to any such person, has a 
corresponding meaning. 
It is this definition that has caused problems, particularly in the context of 
those suffering from an intellectual disability. First, it includes irrelevant 
considerations in the context of the CJA85, such as the "dangerousness" of 
the defendant, secondly intellectual disability alone is specifically excluded 
from the definition,9 and thirdly it requires an "abnormal state of mind", the 
question being whether this abnormality is to be determined on an objective 
or subjective basis. 10 However, despite the anomalies the courts are left with 
no practical alternative but to apply this definition to intellectually 
handicapped defendants. Such defendants may well fall within section 108 of 
the CJA85, except for the crucial fact that they are not mentally disordered. 
9 
10 
MH(CAT)A92, s 4(e). 
The question of whether an intellectual disability constitutes an "abnormal" state of 
mind is discussed below. 
6 
II CHANGING ATTITUDES TO MENTAL HEALTH 
The problem of including intellectually disabled defendants in the current 
fitness to plead regime has arisen primarily through a changing attitude 
towards mental health. In the last 20 to 30 years there has been an 
i ntemational trend towards the humane treatment of those with mental 
illness. Greater clinical knowledge and understanding of mental illness, along 
with more successful stratagem for the treatment of such illness, has resulted 
in a focus on the rights of patients. Prior to these developments, the general 
rule was that those with a mental illness (very widely defined to include 
those with intellectual disabilities and other socially "troublesome" 
afflictions)11 were placed in long term psychiatric institutions as a means of 
"social control". This virtually disregarded the rights of patients in favour of 
what may be loosely described as the "protection of the community". In New 
Zealand, Parliament recognised the very obvious need for reform of the 
Mental Health Act 1969. 12 Reform work dated back to the early l 980's and 
resulted in the current legislation, the MH(CAT)A92. 
The Hon. Katherine O'Regan, then Associate Minister of Health, noted in her 
speech during the second reading of the Mental Health Bill that: "Significant 
mental health law reforms have been undertaken during the past decade or so 
in several parts of the world, including North America, the United Kingdom, 
ll 
12 
See Mental Health Act 1969, s 2, "mental disorder" 
This Act had numerous amendments during its life and was clearly not operating 
satisfactorily. 
7 
Australia, and now New Zealand". 13 She went on to identify the "key 
themes" ofreform as: 14 
an increased emphasis on the need to protect patients' rights and to ensure 
that patients are aware of their entitlements; that appropriate review and 
appeal procedures should be established; the provision of treatment in the 
least restrictive environment; that patients receiving psychiatric treatment 
should be treated as much like other patients as possible, and, wherever 
appropriate, that mental health services should be integrated with general 
medical services; and that multidisciplinary participation in decisions on the 
care and treatment of patients is also important. 
The gist of current thinking is that it is both unnecessary and undesirable to 
confine mentally ill people to institutions for prolonged periods of time. 
Simply put, the mentally ill should be appropriately treated then returned to 
their community. However, this laudable intention may also disguise political 
and financial considerations. In the short term it is obviously less costly to 
rely on "community" care, but this ignores the downstream problems such as 
the release of "dangerous" offenders.15 
The MH(CAT)A92 takes account reform by incorporating the "key themes" 
referred to above. In contrast to the 1969 Act, the MH(CAT)A92 is designed 
with a focus on the rights of the patient rather than as a means of 
confinement. Jn introducing the Mental Health Bill (as it was first known), 
the Minister of Health, the Hon. David Caygill stated that it presented 
"precise procedural requirements for compulsory detention and treatment of 
people with psychiatric disorders. "16 (emphasis added) lt was not intended to 
13 
14 
15 
16 
(12 March 1992) 522 NZPD 6861. 
(12 March 1992) 522 NZPD 6861. 
See generally New Zealand Law Commission Community Safety: Mental Health 
and Criminal Justice Issues: R30 (Wellington, 1994). For further discussion on 
community care see SA Bell and WJ Brookbanks Mental Health law in New 
Zealand (Brooker's, Wellington, 1998) 183-200. 
(8 December 1987) 485 NZPD 1629 
8 
include those with intellectual disabilities, a fact specifically referred to by 
the Minister early in his speech: 17 
There is specific exclusion of . . . intellectual handicap as reasons on their 
own for detention. That is intended as a signal to safeguard against any 
possible abuse of psychiatric hospitals for the purposes of social control. 
The fact that the MH(CAT)A92 was (and is) not intended to include those 
suffering only from an intellectual disability is reinforced by the speech of 
the Hon. Jenny Shipley, then Minister of Health, when she introduced the 
Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Amendment Bill 
1994: 18 
It is important to note that this Bill does not widen the coverage of the 
Mental Health Act to include people who have an intellectual handicap. The 
Bill does not provide a legal framework for the care of people who are 
intellectually handicapped. 
The exclusionary intention of Parliament with regard to those suffering from 
an intellectual disability could not be clearer. 
A Intellectual Disability 
Before discussing whether an intellectual disability is amenable to treatment 
in terms of the MH(CAT)A92, it is necessary to examine the clinical 
definitions of "intellectual disability" . The issue was recently considered in 
some depth by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission. 19 In their 
17 
18 
19 
(8 December 1987) 485 NZPD 1628-1629. 
(29 March 1994) 539 NZPD 902. 
See generally New South Wales Law Reform Commission People with an 
Intellectual Disability and the Criminal Justice System R60 (Sydney, 1996) 56-57. 
9 
report the Commission focused on three of the leading clinical definitions of 
"inte11ectua1 disability" . 20 
ICD-10, 1992: Mental retardation is a condition of arrested or incomplete 
development of the mind, which is especially characterised by impairment of 
skills manifested during the developmental period, which contribute to the 
overall level of intelligence, ie cognitive, language, motor, and social 
abilities. 
AAMR, 1992: Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present 
functioning . It is characterised by significantly sub-average intellectual 
functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of 
the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, 
home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, 
functional academics, leisure, and work, Mental retardation manifests before 
age 18. 
DSM-IV, 1994: The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly 
sub-average general intellectual functioning . . . accompanied by significant 
limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: 
.. . The onset must occur before age 18 years _. 
The "skill areas" referred to in DSM-IV, 1994 reflect those set out in AAMR, 
1992. 
It is immediately evident that the focus of all three definitions is on the 
limitation of intellectual functioning. They take account of the individual's 
ability to carry out the basic requirements of day to day living, and include an 
allowance for degrees of "retardation" ranging from "mild" to "profound".21 
For the purposes of the New South Wales criminal justice system the 
Commission recommend a standard (simplified) definition as: "a 
significantly below average intellectual functioning, existing concurrently 
20 
21 
Here using the generally accepted equivalent of"mental retardation" . 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 19, 55. 
10 
with two or more deficits in adaptive behaviour".22 This recommendation 
will be discussed further in relation to possible reforms in New Zealand. 
"Mental disorder" is less easily defined, particularly given the very broad 
nature of iJlnesses that may be regarded within the loose concept of that term. 
The problem is recognised by Bell: "The law relating to psychiatry and 
mental health has been complicated by lack of agreement on a universa11y 
acceptable definition of 'mental disorder' ".23 And by Shea: " 'Mental health' 
and 'mental illness' or 'mental disorder' are impossible to define in general 
terms (a) because they are socially and culturally determined, and (b) because 
there are both subjective and objective elements involved".24 
There are obvious benefits in not defining mental disorder. The width of a 
comprehensive definition risks the inclusion of everybody: "it is a small step 
to include within the schema ordinary everyday experience".25 Conversely, 
too narrow a definition will have the effect of excluding those needing 
treatment. The issue is further compounded by the competing legal and 
clinical definitions. 
The issue is probably best dealt with on an exclusionary basis, namely by 
setting out what is not a mental illness. This is reflected in the United 
22 
23 
24 
25 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 19, 52. 
Sylvia Bell "Defining Mental Disorder" in Warren Brookbanks (ed) Psychiatry and 
the Law: Clinical and Legal Issues (Brooker's, Wellington, 1996) 71. 
Peter Shea Psychiatry in Court (2 ed, Hawkins Press, Sydney, 1996) 2. 
Bell, above n 23 , 73 . 
11 
Nations Principles for the Protection of persons with Mental Illness and the 
Improvement of Mental Health Care:26 
4.2 A determination of mental illness shall never be made on the basis 
of .. any reason not directly relevant to mental health status. 
This exclusionary definition supports the general consensus that an 
intellectual disability is not a mental i1lness. It is also echoed in the 
MH(CA T)A92. Section 4 clearly sets out the exclusion: 
B 
The procedures prescribed by Parts I and II of this Act shall not be invoked 
in respect of any person by reason only of-
( e) Intellectual [disability]. 
Treatment 
The MH(CAT)A92 is primarily concerned with the compulsory treatment of 
mental disorder in the civil context, but also makes provision for the 
treatment of those disposed of as "special patients" by the criminal courts. 
The question, for the purposes of this paper, is whether an intellectual 
disability will respond to treatment as envisaged by the MH(CAT)A92. 
The consensus of opinion is that an intellectual disability will not respond to 
treatment. Although it may be susceptible to improvement through 
behavioural training and support services, it is not treatable in the way that 
the MH(CAT)A92 envisages. Parliament was astute to this point and made 
specific provision, through section 4(e), for the exclusion of such persons 
26 Bell, above n 23, 73. 
12 
from the operation of the Act. The legislation could not be clearer. Medical 
opinion supports this conclusion. For example, in his submission to the New 
Zealand Law Commission Dr Simpson, then a consultant psychiatrist for the 
Wellington Regional Psychiatry Service, summarised the difference between 
the "treatment" of a mental illness and the "management" of an inteJlectual 
disability:27 
The nature of the care, containment and support that intellectually disabled 
people require however, is very different from that of the mentally ill. Whilst 
they require psychological and psychiatric understanding and appropriately 
structured care, to define such processes as treatment is to miss the 
difference between the onset of an illness which is largely treatable and 
reversible in the case of major mental illness [ and a condition] which is 
simply managed by training, allowance of maturation and caring support in 
the case of an intellectual deficit. This difference rightly requires different 
legal mechanisms for each group. 
In civil proceedings then, there should be no question of attempting to assess 
or treat an intellectually disabled person under the MH(CAT)A92. However, 
as wiJI be discussed below, entry to the MHA(CA T)A92 regime is possible 
for intellectually disabled defendants found to be under disability by the 
criminal courts. In these circumstances the CJA85 disposition options permit 
an order for detention as a "special patient" under the MH(CAT)A92.28 The 
result is that in criminal proceedings a defendant may fall within the 
treatment provisions of the MH(CA T)A92, despite such entry being 
impossible had a civil assessment taken place. This form of disposition is 
obviously convenient for the courts in dealing with intellectually disabled 
defendants, as the only other option may be a sentence of imprisonment. 
Imprisonment would be both unfair and defeat the purpose of the fitness to 
plead regime. The problem, of course, is that as an intellectual disability is 
27 
28 
New Zealand Law Commission, above n 1 S, 40. 
Other options e)cist under CJA85, s 115(2). These are discussed later. 
13 
not treatable it falls outside the ambit of the MH(CA T)A92. The rev1ew 
process29 wi11 inevitably result in a finding to this effect and the person will 
be discharged, making the initial committal futile. 
The root of this unsatisfactory state of affairs lies in the interpretation the 
courts have been forced to place on an "abnormal state of mind". 
C Abnormal State of Mind 
The scope of the MH(CAT)A92 is limited through the fundamental 
requirement of an "abnormal state of mind" in the definition of "mental 
disorder". This immediately begs the question of what is "normal"? Does 
"abnormal" mean abnormal in comparison to an average person ( objective 
abnormality) or abnormal for the particular person (subjective abnormality)? 
Logic and common sense dictate that the latter is the correct approach. To 
attempt to apply an objective definition would be contrary to the purpose of 
the Act and would defy definition. It may be that a person with a psychiatric 
illness would respond to treatment, yet would never meet the threshold test of 
"normal". "Abnormal" must surely apply to the state of mind of the individual 
subject. If that person has an intellectual disability, then that state of mind is 
normal for them. No amount of treatment will have any effect on the 
underlying disability. This line of reasoning is supported by Bell: "A person 
29 Orders made under CJA85, ss 115 and sl 16 are subject to a statutory review 
programme. MH(CA T)A92, ss 77 and 80 are applicable to the review of special 
patients. 
14 
with an intellectual disability is not suffering from a mental illness, their 
condition is normal for them"_30 
Jn contrast, a psychiatric disorder is truly an "abnormal" state of mind. The 
person is suffering from a recognised psychiatric illness that will respond to 
treatment. In turn the treatment will restore that person's mind to "normal" 
for that person. The distinction between intellectual disability and mental 
illness is succinctly summarised by Bell :31 
A person with an intellectual disability will always be intellectually disabled. 
Mental illness, by comparison, presents with observable symptoms. When a 
person with a mental illness, for example, exhibits symptoms such as 
delusions, hallucinations, or severe mood disturbance, there is a well-
established body of clinical knowledge and practice to assist decision-
making about intervening to prevent harm to self or others. 
The New Zealand Law Commission has suggested that the inclusion of an 
"abnormal" state of mind has not added anything to the 1992 definition and 
suggested its deletion. 32 
The thrust of the MH(CAT)A92 is the compulsory treatment of mental illness 
and, as has been argued above, it is not concerned with those suffering only 
from an intellectual disability. The conclusion is that the MH(CAT)A92 
definition is being abused by classifying an inte11ectual disability as an 
"abnormal state of mind". 
Having established the clear intention of the legislature to specifically 
exclude those with only an intellectual disability from the ambit of the 
30 
31 
32 
Bell, above n 23, 81 . 
Reflecting the provisos in the definition of"mental disorder" . Bell , above n 23 , 81. 
New Zealand Law Commission, above n 15, 42-43 . 
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MH(CA T)A92 it is necessary to examine the inadequacies of the current 
fitness to plead regime. 
Ill INADEQUACIES OF THE CJA85/MH(CAT)A92 FITNESS TO 
PLEAD REGIME 
The problems that have arisen within the current fitness to plead regime are a 
result of the MH(CAT)A92 failing to take account of the interdependence of 
the relevant provisions of the CJA85. The crux of the matter lies in the 
reliance of section 108 of the CJA85 on the :MH(CAT)A92 definition of 
"mental disorder". As discussed above, without a finding of a mental disorder 
the courts are quite simply unable to find a1!- defendant to be under disability 
in terms of section 108. 
A Reliance on "Mental Disorder" 
This crucial importance of the definition of "mental disorder" is that the 
entire fitness to plead regime is dependent upon it. The court must decide, on 
the evidence of two medical practitioners,33 whether that definition applies 
to the defendant and whether a finding of "under disability" in terms of 
section l 08 is appropriate. 34 
33 
34 
CJA85, s 111 . 
Psychiatric evidence tends to support the view that no "mental disorder" is present, 
yet the courts have adopted an interpretation of the definition that favours the 
contrary view. See the discussion below. 
16 
The problem, for the purposes of this paper, is in applying a "mental 
disorder" to an intellectually disabled defendant. If the defendant is not 
mentally disordered (as defined) then there is simply no scope for a disability 
finding. In the case of a defendant suffering from an intellectual disability 
and nothing more, then (relying on both the terminology of the section 2 
definition and the clear exclusion in section 4(e) of the MH(CAT)A92) that 
person is not mentally disordered and there is clearly no scope for such a 
finding. It is only where the accused is suffering from an "abnormal state of 
mind" that a finding of disability can be arrived at. However, to ensure that 
the fitness to plead regime does in fact apply to the intellectually disabled, 
the criminal courts have resorted to a very wide interpretation of the 
definition of "mental1y disordered". 
This problem did not occur under the predecessor to the MH(CA T)A92, the 
Mental Health Act 1969. The fitness to plead provisions of the CJA85 relied 
upon this Act until the passage of the MH(CAT)A92. Section 2 of the 1969 
Act defined "mental disorder" very widely: 
"Mentally disordered", in relation to any person, means suffering from a 
psychiatric or other disorder, whether continuous or episodic, that 
substantially impairs mental health, so that the person belongs to one of 
more of the following classes, namely: 
(a) Mentally ill - that is, requiring care and treatment for a 
mental illness; 
(b) Mentally infinn - that is, requiring care and treatment by reason 
of mental infirmity arising from age or deterioration of or injury to the brain: 
(c) Mentally subnonnal - that is, suffering from subnormality of 
intelligence as a result of arrested or incomplete development of mind. 
17 
It included psychiatric or other disorder, and it is clear from paragraph ( c) 
that those with an intelJectual disability were specifically included. This 
legislation generally predated the changing attitude to mental health 
discussed above, and the stark fact was that those with an intellectual 
disability were, for the purposes of the 1969 Act, considered to be suffering 
from a mental disorder. Although this situation was clearly unjust, that is not 
within the scope of this paper. Suffice to say, the CJA85 fitness to plead 
provisions worked adequately, and appear to have caused little problem in 
relation to disability hearings.35 While the 1969 Act was in force the 
intellectually disabled fell squarely within the definition of "menta1ly 
disordered". 
The conundrum for the courts smce the passmg into law of the 
MH(CAT)A92 is that, as discussed above, on a strict interpretation of the 
provisions, an intellectually disabled defendant cannot be found to be under 
disability even if they meet a11 the other criteria of section 108 of the CJA85. 
They are simply not "mentally disordered". However, although procedural 
fairness dictates that such persons should not be required to stand trial, the 
inability to find them "under disability" would leave no other way of 
disposing of the case.36 The undesirable result of such an interpretation 
would be that the court would have no option but to continue to hear the case 
as if the defendant was not intellectually disabled. 37 This dichotomy is a 
35 
36 
37 
Perhaps because that act overtly condoned the involuntary confinement of 
intellectually disabled persons in mental institutions. 
Except by continuing with the trial anyway. 
There may be scope for the High Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction, but this 
option is not open to the District Court . In either case the problem of disposition 
remains: see generally Warren Brookbanks "Fitness to be tried" [1996) NZLJ 135, 
136 
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result of the failure of Parliament to make appropriate consequential 
amendments to the CJA85 at the same time as the MH(CAT)A92 was passed. 
As it stands, the CJA85 fails to take account of the much narrower definition 
of "mental disorder". In particular it contains no mechanism to deal with the 
groups excluded by section 4 of the MH(CAT)A92. 
The fact that the inte11ectual1y disabled are, and should be, excluded from the 
operation of the MH(CAT)A92 is supported by reference to the "civil" 
application of that Act. A person could not be made the subject of an order 
under that Act merely because of an intellectual disability. 38 If this same 
plain reasoning is applied to the operation of the CJA85 "disability" 
provisions, then an intellectually disabled person could never be found to be 
under disability unless there was a dual diagnosis.39 The New Zealand Law 
Commission has recognised this interpretational problem, suggesting that:40 
In ruling that intellectual handicap can come within the 1992 definition of 
mental disorder for the purpose of disability hearings, it may be that the 
courts are stretching the definition to ensure that justice is done. 
The Commission was critical of the reliance on the 1992 definition in 
relation to disability hearings, noting that the purpose of a disability hearing 
is to ensure procedural fairness. 41 As the Commission noted, the focus 
should be on the defendant's ability to participate in the trial (as set out in 
section l 08) rather than on the 1992 definition and its concern with 
dangerousness and inability for self care. These ancillary matters are 
38 
39 
40 
41 
MH(CAT)A92, s 4(e) 
An intellectual disability compounded by a recognised psychiatric disorder. 
New Zealand Law Commission, above n 15, 42-43. 
See also New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(a). 
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pertinent to civil proceedings under the MH(CA T)A92 but irrelevant to 
disability issues in criminal proceedings.42 
It is evident from the above discussion that there is a marked difference 
between a "mental disorder" and an "intellectual disability". The 
MH(CAT)A92 clearly recognises the distinction but, due to the failure of the 
legislature to amend the CJA85, for the purposes of the criminal justice 
system the two afflictions have been invariably treated by the courts as the 
same. 
B Approach of the Courts 
The discussion above is brought into sharp focus through a consideration of 
the approach adopted by the courts in dealing with the problem of classifying 
an intellectually disabled defendant as "mentally disordered. 
42 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 15, 45 . See genera1Jy Ian Freckleton 
"Assessment of Fitness to Stand Trial" in Legal Research Foundation Unfitness to 
Stand Trial: Under Disability in the 90's (University of Auckland, 1995) 21. 
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I R v T [a mental patient J 
The first case to be heard under the "new" MH(CAT)A92 regime was R v T 
[ a mental patient}. 43 The judgment began with a quote which highlighted the 
problem that the court faced: 44 
The position of the intellectually handicapped is particularly unclear. They 
appear to be excluded from the scope of compulsion by s.4( e) [ of the 
MH(CAT)A92] ... Are they covered under s.2 or excluded by s.4(e)? ... It is 
not possible to give an informed answer to it until these sections have been 
judicially considered. 
In short, the question was whether, in the context of a disability hearing, the 
MH(CAT)A92 definition of "mentally disordered" encompassed those with 
only an intellectual disability. 
T faced a charge of assault with intent to commit sexual violation. It was 
readily accepted that he was mentally retarded45 but not mentally ill. 
Psychiatric reports were presented to the court. One concluded that "[o]ur 
understanding is that the current law [the MH(CAT)A92] excludes 
compulsory supervisory care for individuals like T who present as 
intellectually handicapped, but have no superimposed mental illness".46 The 
other psychiatrist "doubted that psychiatric hospitals are the best places for 
the intellectually handicapped as they are not geared to deal with this group 
of people and often become a place of danger and exploitation".47 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
R v T fa mental patient] [1993) OCR 600. 
R v T [a mental patient/, above n 43, 602 . 
This was the term used by the judge and reflects the terminology used in the 
American definitions of "mental retardation" discussed above. 
R v T fa mental patient}, above n 43 , 603 . 
R v T fa mental patient/, above n 43, 607. 
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Clearly this unanimous medical opm10n placed the defendant squarely 
outside the intended scope of the MH(CAT)A92. However, the court went on 
to consider whether T's condition indicated that he was "mentally disordered" 
for the purposes of section 108 (of the CJA85). It was noted that there was a 
difference between what psychiatrists understood by the term "mental 
disorder" and how the MH(CAT)A92 defined it. The conclusion was that as 
the MH(CA T)A92 definition had its origins in the l 970's it "may not 
necessarily be using the term 'mental disorder' entirely as it is understood by 
psychiatrists today". 48 
In finding that a "mentally retarded" person could be within the definition of 
"mentally disordered", Judge McEirea set out eight reasons for finding the 
defendant to be under disability. 49 The first issue was whether the 
fundamental requirement of a "mental disorder" was satisfied. 50 The Judge 
held that there was a mental disorder, basing his judgment on the proposition 
that mental retardation is an "abnormal state of mind". This relies on the 
"objective" definition of intellectual disability, discussed above and rejected 
in favour of the "subjective" interpretation. The state of mind of the 
intellectually disabled person is "normal" for that particular person. Reliance 
on the objective approach involves a hypothetical interpretation of what is 
"normal" . If a person is classed as having an "abnormal state of mind" simply 
because their permanent intelligence quotient is below a certain level (ie the 
"normal" range) then presumably the hypothesis could apply equally at the 
48 
49 
50 
R v 7' fa mental patient}, above n 43 , 609. This clearly rejected the opinions of the 
two medical practitioners required to advise the court under CJA85, s 111 . 
R v T fa mental patient}, above n 43, 610-612. 
The remainder of the reasoning analyses the operation of the MH(CAT)A92, relying 
on the assumption that the defendant was mentally disordered. 
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other end of the range. Those with a permanent IQ above the "normal" range 
would also be classed as having an abnormal state of mind. The only logical 
conclusion is that the subjective interpretation is the one intended by 
Parliament. On this ground alone, the finding of the Court could be 
overturned. If an accused does not have an "abnormal state of mind" then, 
quite simply, they cannot be "mentally disordered" in terms of the 
MH(CAT)A92 definition, and further attempts at justifying their inclusion 
are not tenable. 51 
2 Subsequent decisions 
Despite the above criticisms, R v T reflects the approach of the courts in 
subsequent decisions as a method of finding intellectually disabled 
defendants to be "mentally disordered" and therefore within the 
MH(CAT)A92. 52 The courts, while recognising the problem, have readily 
accepted that section 4( e) does not operate to exclude intellectually disabled 
defendants entering the MH(CAT)A92 regime "[v]ia a back door, opened by 
the Criminal Justice Act". 53 
A postscript to R v T is found in Police v M (No 2) : "shortly after the Court 
made a compulsory treatment order, an application for review of the patient's 
51 
52 
53 
See generally Lynda Crowley-Smith "Intellectual Disability and Mental Illness: A 
Call for Unambiguous and Uniform Statutory Definitions" (1995) 3 J Law & Med 
192. 
However, this "objective" approach has also been adopted by the High Court: "It is 
my view that abnormal relates to the standard of the community as a whole . .". R v 
M ([66194) (1994) 12 CRNZ 328, 332 per Neazor J. 
ReJNM[1996] NZFLR 88, 95 . 
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status was brought and T was discharged from compulsory status. Fairly 
shortly after that, he drowned himself''. 54 This outcome reflects the 
"downstream" problem in finding an intellectually disabled offender to be 
mentaJJy disordered. The disposition is dearly inappropriate and merely 
delays the inevitable: no treatment is available, the person is discharged from 
compulsory status, there is no provision for compulsory community support, 
and there is a high likelihood of recidivism. 
However, the courts can only work within the parameters of the legislation. 
The stark choice in R v T was to either find the defendant under disability 
and make the best of an inappropriate range of orders, or continue to try him 
despite his disability and pass an equally inappropriate sentence. 
In Police v M (No 2), the futility of the section 115(1) order that Judge 
Boshier made was recognised even as it was being made. 55 
I sympathise with the psychiatrists who may be faced with receiving a 
patient whom they cannot treat in conventional terms. But, nevertheless, the 
legislature seems to me to give the Court the ability to make such an order. 
Recent decisions56 demonstrate that finding an intellectually disabled 
defendant to be "mentally disordered" for the purposes of section 108 is now 
the norm. A finding that an accused is under disability is certainly of benefit 
to the court. It allows for disposition of the case without the "almost 
obscene" 57 ritual of an intellectually disabled accused attempting to present 
54 
55 
56 
57 
Police vM (No 2) [1994] DCR 388,396. 
Police v M (No 2), above n 54, 396. 
See generally R v E (18 August 1999) unreported, High Court, Hamilton Registry, 
T9823-98, Penlington l Although the defendant suffered an intellectual disability 
resulting from meningitis and lead poisoning during infancy the court found him 
under disability. There appeared to be no dual diagnosis. 
H v T /a mental patient), above n 43, 611 . 
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their own defence. It also avoids trying and sentencing those who are 
probably not culpable or able to comprehend the court proceedings. The 
problem, of course, is the downstream effect of such dispositions. The 
responsibility is then effectively passed on to those administering the mental 
health system. It becomes the problem of the psychiatric institutions to 
attempt to deal with unsuitably placed defendants. The comments of Judge 
Boshier in Police v M (No2) demonstrate the inevitable outcome, namely the 
release of the patient at the first review. 
C Disposition 
Under section 111 of the CJA85 , for a defendant to be eligible to be found 
under disability the threshold requirement that the charge is punishable by 
imprisomnent must be met. 58 Presumably, the question of whether a 
defendant is under disability does not arise where a lesser charge is laid, or 
where the offence is one of strict or absolute liability. 59 This raises the point 
that when the defendant is brought before the courts the charge is usually 
serious.60 
58 
59 
60 
The reference to "death" appears supert1uous: see Abolition of the Death Penalty 
Act 1989. 
In strict and absolute liability offences mens rea will not be an issue. The fact that the 
defendant is mentally disordered is therefore irrelevant. 
The cases often concern violent offences and arson. These appear typical of the 
charges that lead to disability hearings. 
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I Disposition options 
Disposition of those found to be under disability is by reference to section 
115 of the CJA85_61 
115. Order to be made if person under disability or insane- (I) Subject 
to subsection (2) and ( 4) of this section, if a person-
(a) is found to be under disability; or 
(b) 
the court shall make an order that the person be detained in a hospital as a 
special patient under the [Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment) Act 1992]. 
(2) In any case to which subsection (I) of this section applies, the court, 
having regard to all the circumstances of the case and being satisfied, after 
hearing medical evidence, that it would be safe in the interests of the public 
to make an order under this subsection, may, instead of malcing an order 
under subsection (I) of this section, -
(a) Make an order that the person be detained in a hospital as 
a patient; or 
(b) Make an order for the person's immediate release; or 
( c) If the person is liable to be detained under any full-time 
custodial sentence, decide not to make any order under this section. 
It is perhaps less difficult to find alternative disposition options when the 
charge is minor, and in such circumstances the case may be disposed of prior 
to trial, perhaps through diversion or through the prosecutor electing not to 
pursue the charge. 62 It is where the offence is serious and a decision made to 
61 
62 
CJA85, s I 16 sets out the maximum duration of an order for detention as a special 
patient. 
For example, previous allegations of sexual assault did not reach the Court in R v 7': 
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proceed to trial that the problem of disposition. arises. Without recourse to the 
fitness to plead regime, it is difficult to suggest how a court could deal with 
the matter. The usual range of sentencing options are obviously not desirable 
or practical, and to release the defendant without conviction would be 
technically correct,63 but perhaps socially irresponsible. To continue with the 
trial would be procedurally unfair, and would still leave the problem of 
sentencing unresolved. 
2 The problem of dealing with intellectually disabled defendants 
The above discussion raises the vexed question of what to do with 
intellectually disabled defendants found to be under disability. There is a 
natural tension between the need for procedural fairness on the one hand 
(hence the fitness to plead regime), and the need to protect society from 
potentially dangerous offenders on the other. An intellectually disabled 
person may well have committed a serious offence but to deal with them in 
the same way as a "normal" offender would be patently unjust. Instead, the 
criminal law is flexible enough to recognise degrees of responsibility, for 
example through the provision of defences to crimes. It also provides for 
alternatives to prison for those found to be under disability. 
The notion of responsibility involves a consideration of the "character 
conception". The action of the defendant is analysed on a subjective basis. 
63 
R v T /a mental patient}, above n 43, 604. 
CJ A, s ll 5(2)(b ). 
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The defendant must know that the action is wrong and be able to have acted 
differently before they may be said to be truly responsible for their actions. 64 
[A]ctions for which we hold a person fully responsible are those in which 
her usual character is centrally expressed .. . Actions performed by a person 
suffering from a long term mental incapacity, whilst they call for a different 
reactive response in terms of traditional conceptions of blameworthiness, 
still appear to call for some controlling intervention on the part of the state. 
In this model, responsibility is based on the "usual" character of the 
defendant. An intellectually disabled offender may have no perception of the 
moral wrongfulness of the offence nor have been able to rationally choose to 
have acted differently. Consequently the usual range of sentences available to 
the court will be of little use, either as a deterrent measure or as a humane 
means of containment. To sentence an intellectually disabled offender to a 
prison sentence would be of no benefit other than for containment and such a 
defendant would be very likely to suffer abuse in such an environment. 
However, it would not be desirable to simply ignore the deviant behaviour: 
"The action cannot be said to be a mere aberration on the part of the accused, 
the risks of repetition may be high"_65 This risk of recidivism and the need 
for the courts to do "something" has led to the development of particular 
dispositional options for those with a mental disorder, but these options are 
clearly not suitable for offenders with only an intellectual disability 
64 
65 
Nicola Lacey State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values 
(London, Routledge, I 988) 66. 
Lacey, above n 64, 66. 
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3 Ineffectiveness ofsection 115 orders 
The ineffectiveness of the available orders currently available has become 
more evident as the case law develops. For example, in Police v P66 the 
defendant was not new to the court process. Judge Moore was obviously 
exasperated with the process, opening his judgment with "Mr P is yet again 
before the Court".67 It was not a question of whether P was still under 
disability in relation to the fresh charges, but rather how to dispose of the 
case. The judge commented that to make an order under section 115(1) for 
someone like Mr P would be: "to make an order for their destruction ... it 
would require that they be confined with the criminally insane". 68 He went 
on to highlight the problems of "trying to find the most appropriate of a series 
of inappropriate solutions"69 in cases such as this, noting that it would be 
"obscene" to make P a special patient. The result was that P was ordered to 
be detained as a "patient" under sl 15(2)(a) of the CJA85. Judge Moore 
recognised that what happened after P was reviewed was "not a matter over 
which I have any control", and that it highlighted the: "lack of controlled 
facilities [ meaning caregivers having the powers of constraint and restraint 
where required] for the intellectually handicapped".70 It is perhaps this latter 
point that is of the greatest importance in suggesting any meaningful reform 
to the current system. Whatever powers are given to the court by Parliament 
must be worthwhile and amount to more than mere social control. 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
Police v P [1997] DCR 823 . 
Police v P above n 66, 824. 
Police v P above n 66, , 826. 
Police v P above n 66, 827 . 
Police v P above n 66, 827 . 
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As an alternative to section 115(1) orders, some courts are usmg the 
dispositional options under section l] 5(2)(b). In two cases the defendants 
were found to be under disability but then released back into the community. 
Police v Navarelt 71 involved an accused charged with indecent assault being 
released (under sll5(2)(b)) due to the inappropriateness of any other of the 
available orders. Similarly, Police v P72 involved assault on a female and 
attempted arson. The accused had a mental capacity of below average, and a 
marginal ability to plead. He was also unable to communicate with counsel 
and was, as a consequence, found to be under disability. Again, due to the 
lack of any appropriate alternative, the accused was released under 
sl 15(2)(b). 
While this is, perhaps, a sensible way of dealing with such cases, it does 
rather jar with the concept of "mentally disordered" as defined. It also fails to 
deal with the problems highlighted by Lacey and discussed above. To be 
mentally disordered involves an abnormal state of mind, but then also 
requires that as a result of such an abnormal state of mind, that person: 73 
(a) poses a serious danger to the health or safety of that person or 
of others; or 
(b) Seriously diminishes the capacity of that person to take care of 
himself or herself. 
It is difficult to reconcile the concepts of posing a serious danger or of 
possessing a seriously diminished capacity for self care with an order for 
71 
72 
73 
----·- - - -- - -
Police v Navarell (3 September 1996) unreported, District Court, Otahuhu, CRN 
0648017116, Judge Moore, 
Police v P (3 December 1996) unreported, District Court, Otahuhu, CRN 
6058021202, CRN 6048021203, CRN 6004037558, Judge Moore. This was the 
precursor to the reported case of Police v P above n 66. 
MH(CAT)A92, s 2, "mental disorder" . 
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immediate release under s 115(2)(b ). 74 The point is that the courts are quite 
simply unable to effectively deal with intellectually disabled defendants 
found to be under disability. This again highlights the need for reform. 
4 The review process 
Any order made by the court is subject to review under the provisions of the 
MH(CAT)A92.75 As these reviews are carried out by mental health 
professionals, rather than the courts, the opinion that intellectual disability 
does not constitute a mental disorder will inevitably prevail. Re JNM76 
demonstrates trus mental health perspective and highlights the downstream 
problems of disposition referred to above. 
JNM had been before the District Court on charges of intentional damage, 
and, despite suffering only an intellectual disability, was found to be under 
disability and disposed of by way of a compulsory treatment order. A 
statutory review was subsequently undertaken, with psychiatric opinion being 
that JNM should not be detained under the MH(CAT)A92. The reviewing 
psychiatrist had concerns as to what implications the release would have, 
both on the patient and on the community, and asked the Tribunal to decide 
the issue. 
74 
75 
76 
The problem is compounded by the lack of enforceable orders available to ensure 
that the order is actually carried out: " ... consequent upon the last order having 
been made, no action at all occurred on the part of Waitemata Health" : Police v M 
(No 2), above n 54, 394 per Judge Boshier. 
MH(CAT)A92, s 80. 
Re .!NM above n 53. 
31 
The problem for the Tribunal was summed up as follows: 77 
The significance of the applicant's entry into the system is that he has not yet 
been dealt with pursuant to Part I of the Act and therefore the question of 
whether s4(e) of Part I applies has not been considered. 
[T]he applicant suffers from intellectual disability, he has no superimposed 
mental illness and while he may satisfy the test of mental disorder under s2 
of the Act, he cannot be held pursuant to a compulsory treatment order 
because of the provisions of s4( e). 
The result was that the Tribunal had no alternative but to order JNM's 
release. In doing so they noted the "distressing and predictable" consequences 
of this action: 78 
[T]he applicant is placed back in a vulnerable situation where it is likely that 
he will again come to the notice of the police through some act on his part 
which may place himself or others in danger. In that event the circle for him 
will be repeated ... The legislation is such that no alternative is available to 
us. 
The Tribunal concluded by recording their: "grave concerns for the 
applicant's welfare and for the safety of other who may come into contact 
with the applicant, once discharged". 79 
This case demonstrates the inevitable outcome of disposing of inteJlectually 
disabled defendants by way of the MH(CAT)A92. The court order merely 
delays the release of the defendant back into the community. It is clear that 
Parliament did not intend intellectually disabled defendants to be 
compulsorily detained under the MH(CAT)A92, and to use the CJA85 as a 
route to such detainment is flawed, although perhaps understandable. The 
courts are dealing with intellectual1y disabled defendants in the best way they 
77 
78 
79 
Re JNM above n 53, 93. 
Re )NM above n 53 , 95. 
Re JNM above n 53 , 96. 
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are able under the manifestly inappropriate current legislative regime, but the 
problem then passes to those administering the mental health system. Neither 
system can accommodate or deal with the problem. Legislative intervention 
appears to be the only route to a solution. 
IV REFORM BILLS 
Having discussed at some length the shortcomings of the present fitness to 
plead regime as it applies to those with only an intellectual disability, it is 
necessary to examine the reforms that are currently before Parliament. The 
purpose of this discussion is to consider the extent to which the problems 
with the current regime wi11 be overcome. 
Parliament's answer to the problem has been to take a completely fresh look 
at the fitness to plead regime, with particular emphasis on how to deal with 
intellectually disabled offenders. The proposed reforms are contained in two 
BilJs, the Criminal Justice Amendment Bill (No.7)80 ("the CJAB") and the 
Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care) Bill81 ("the ID(CC)B"). These Bills 
have evolved over several years and reflect the recommendations of the New 
Zealand Law Commission. 82 They received their second reading on 5 
October 1999,83 and were referred to the Health Committee for 
consideration. The Committee's report is due on 30 November 2000. 84 
80 
81 
82 
83 
No 328-1. 
No 329-1 . 
New Zealand Law Commission, above n 15, 54-55. See generally Warren 
Brookbanks "Fitness to Plead and the Intellectually Disabled Offender" l Psychiatry, 
Psychology and Law (1994) 171. 
(S October 1999) 580 NZPD 19695 (ID(CC)B); (S October 1999) 580 NZPD 
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The Bills herald major changes to the current fitness to plead regime. The 
CJAB replaces Part VU of the CJA85 in its entirety, and includes dedicated 
disposition options for offenders with intellectual disabilities. These 
prov1s1ons are linked to the ID(CC)B, which is designed to provide 
"compulsory care" for such offenders. It is the reliance on an inappropriate 
definition and the lack of dispositional options that have caused the problems 
discussed above. The panacea is to be in the CJAB/ID(CC)B regime. 
Most of the prov1s1ons discussed below are specific to the needs of 
intellectually disabled offenders. However, although some amendments are 
of a general nature they are too important to pass without comment. 
A The Criminal Justice Amendment Bill (No 7) 
The current problem of having to find intellectually disabled offenders to be 
mentally disordered to enable a finding of "under disability" could have been 
avoided by a simple amendment to section 108 of the CJA85 at the time the 
84 
19703 . This was the last day of sitting for the old Parliament and the Bills were 
carried over to the new Parliament. 
(28 August 2000) Parliamentary Bulletin, 8. The report was originally due on 1 
September 2000. 
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Ml-I(CAT)A92 was enacted. For example, the section could have simply been 
amended to read: 
... a person is under disability if, because of the extent to which that person 
is mentally disordered lor intellectually disabled] that person is unable ... 
This would have solved the problems experienced by the courts over the last 
eight years, but would, of course, leave the fundamental problem of how to 
dispose of such offenders unanswered. 
Before embarking on a discussion of whether the proposed regime will 
remedy the problems discussed above, an important innovation of the CJAB 
should be briefly discussed. 
I Involvement in the Offence 
A major omission in the current fitness to plead regime is that it does not 
require, or in fact allow, a consideration of the defendant's involvement in the 
offence. In Police v P Judge Moore noted that "an order can be made on a 
finding of disability without any requirement for an examination of the 
strength of the case against the person who is the subject of the order". 85 The 
CJAB has attempted to remedy this problem by requiring that the court must 
be satisfied of the defendant's involvement in the offence before a finding of 
unfitness to stand trial is made. 86 This innovation represents a significant 
85 
86 
Police v P above n 66, 826. 
Clause 111 This reflects the overseas trend: see for example Criminal Procedure 
(Insanity and Fitness to Plead) Act 1991 (UK), s 4; Mental Health ( Criminal 
Procedure) Act 1990 (NSW), s 22(1). The procedure to be followed is set out in cls 
lllA to 11 lF. 
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step forward in the protection of the rights of mentally impaired defendants. 
However, this clause has been subject to criticism on the ground that the 
standard of proof required is "on the balance of probabilities". The argument 
is that clause 1 1 1 effectively discriminates against those with mental 
impainnents and should be redrafted to require the same standard as that 
applicable to any other offender, namely "beyond reasonable doubt" _87 
In practice, however, this is probably not a practical or desirable option. To 
satisfy such an evidential burden would involve all the evidence being heard 
and tested in the usual adversarial manner. It would obviously amount to a 
full trial and would contradict the very purpose of the fitness regime and 
render it redundant. If a full trial has taken place, then it suggests that either 
the defendant was fit to stand trial or has been tried unjustly. The fitness 
regime would then be reduced to an exercise in seman6cs, and the only real 
issue would be one of disposition. Such a trial would do no service to the 
mentally impaired offender nor to justice. In the very special circumstances 
of a fitness to stand trial regime, the lower standard of proof may be seen as 
discrimination of a justifiable nature. 
Even though peripheral to this paper, clause I 11 cannot be ignored. It is the 
threshold that must be passed before the issue of unfitness is considered. The 
following discussion assumes that the defendant has been found to have been 
involved in the offence. 
87 See generally Human Rights Commission "Submission of the Human Rights 
Commission on the Criminal Justice Amendment Bill (No 7), 4-5. 
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2 "Unfit to Stand Trial" 
The starting point for the new fitness regime is clause 108 of the CJAB: 
108. Interpretation - (1) For the purposes of the Part, "unfit to stand trial" 
means an inability, due to mental impainnent, to conduct a defence or to 
instruct counsel to do so. 
(2) For example, a person is unfit to stand trial if, due to mental 
impairment, the person is unable-
(a) To plead: 
(b) To adequately understand the nature of purpose or 
possible consequence of the proceedings: 
(c) To communicate adequately with counsel for the purposes 
of conducting a defence: 
(d) To make an informed decision whether or not to give 
evidence. 
As in the current regime, a finding of unfitness to stand trial is available only 
where the accused is charged with an imprisonable offence. 88 
Clause 108 introduces the term "unfit to stand trial" instead of the current 
"under disability". The reason for this change in terminology is not given in 
the explanatory note to the Bill, but it perhaps serves to emphasise the 
distinction between "under disability" and "intellectual disability". 
- ----- - - --· ----
88 CJA85, s 111 ; CJAB, cl 108A 
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3 "Mental Impairment" 
Of central importance to this new interpretation clause is the substitution of 
the term "mental impairment" for the current definition of "mental disorder" . 
It is this latter term that has caused the problems discussed above, namely 
that the term, as defined in the MH(CAT)A92, specifically excludes 
inte11ectual disability. The CJAB deliberately refrains from defining "mental 
impairment",89 instead leaving it up to the court to determine what is or is 
not included. The clear intention is to allow the inclusion of both "mental 
disorder" and "intellectual disability",90 but to also leave open the possibility 
of inducting other manifestations of mental impairment. 
Despite the intentions of the drafters, all the submissions that deal with 
clause 108 were critical of the intention to leave "mental impairment" 
undefined. 91 In his submission to the Health Committee, Warren Brookbanks 
highlighted the problems encountered in New South Wales, namely that the 
courts could interpret the term narrowly to exclude "unmeritorious" cases".92 
Whether the New Zealand courts would in fact adopt this limited approach is 
a moot point, but it does support the argument for providing a clear 
definition, if only to avoid confusion. 
89 
90 
91 
92 
As recommended by the New Zealand Law Commission, above n 15, 127. 
CJAB, explanatory note, ii. 
It is interesting to note that only eight submissions were received on the CJAB. This 
perhaps reflects a lack of knowledge of the impact this bill may have on those unfit 
to stand trial. 
Warren Brookbanks "Submission to Parliamentary Select Committee considering the 
Criminal Justice Amendment Bill (No 7) 1999" 1. 
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Other submissions call for a definition on the basis that "mental impairment" 
could be used to include offenders who do not fall within the ambit of either 
the MH(CAT)A92 or the ID(CC)B. Although this appears to be the intention 
of the drafters, it could lead to the detention of defendants in an inappropriate 
environment. 93 These submissions suggest that "mental impairment" should 
be defined as being either a mental disorder (MH(CAT)A92) or an 
intellectual disability (ID(CC)B). Although perhaps more limiting on the 
courts in terms of what constitutes a "qualifying" impairment, the suggestion 
does have merit. For example, it would ensure that the term was consistent 
with the dispositions available under clauses 115A and B of the CJAB. These 
clauses are discussed below, but basically rely on either the MH(CAT)A92 or 
the ID(CC)B. If these orders are used, then logic dictates that the offender 
must be either "mentally disordered" ( which could include a "dual 
diagnosis") or "intellectually disabled" . As both of these impairments are 
clearly and comprehensively defined there appears to be little scope for the 
inclusion of other "impairments". This is reinforced by the specific 
exclusions set out in the explanatory note to the ID(CC)B.94 
Leaving "intellectual impairment" undefined is appealing in that it will allow 
the court some degree of flexibility in interpreting the term. However, for the 
sake of clarity, it may be preferable to define mental impairment as 
93 
94 
See generally MentaJ HeaJth Commission "Submission on Criminal Justice Act 
Amendment Bill (number 7)" 1. This may have the effect of transposing the current 
problem from intellectually disabled offenders to another group of mentally impaired 
offenders. 
ID(CC)B, explanatory note, iii . The exclusions relate to impainnents caused after 
age 18, those covered by the MH(CAT)A92, and personality disorders. This 
contrasts with the New South Wales Law Refom1 Commission definition which 
includes such impairments as dementia and brain injury acquired after age 18: above 
n 19, 52 
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encompassing both intellectual disability and mental disorder. This could be 
achieved by the use of a non-exhaustive definition such as "mental 
impairment includes ... ". The adoption of a definition such as this would 
serve to specifically include those with an intellectual disability or mental 
disorder, yet would still be wide enough to allow the courts to ensure 
procedural fairness by finding a defendant unfit to stand trial through an 
impairment that does not meet the strict criteria of the either definition. 
However, even with a definition such as this, the limited scope of the 
dispositions under the CJAB95 and the specific exclusions in the ID(CC)B 
make it difficult to envisage what else the courts would be able to include as 
a qualifying mental impairment. If the term is to be more widely interpreted, 
then there would be a need for a greater range of orders, perhaps adding to 
clause 115B an option allowing the court to make an "appropriate order". 
Despite the competing arguments on whether this new term should be 
defined, it is gratifying to note that it represents a significant improvement 
for those with only an intellectual disability. Even if left undefined, "mental 
impairment" clearly includes those with only an intellectual disability. The 
courts will no longer be required to artificially find that an intellectually 
disabled offender suffers from a mental disorder. 96 
95 
96 
CJAB, cls 1 I SA and Bare discussed below. 
The explanatory notes verify this: CJAB, explanatory note, ii. 
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4 Inability to conduct a defence or instruct counsel to do so 
Although not specifica1ly aimed at intellectua1ly disabled offenders, clause 
108 places the focus on an "inability ... to conduct a defence or to instruct 
counsel to do so".97 This is an extension of the current section 108(1)(c), and 
appears to greatly lower the threshold currently required for a disability 
finding. At the lowest level, it is arguable that the requirement is simply that 
the offender is personally unable to conduct a defence due to mental 
impairment. This will obviously include virtually all intellectually disabled 
offenders, whether or not they fall within the definition of "intellectual 
disability". The fact that "mental impairment" is undefined supports this 
contention. 
The remainder of the current definition is relegated to subclause (2), as 
examples of what may lead to a person being found unfit to stand trial. It also 
introduces a new example, an inability "[t]o make an informed decision 
whether or not to give evidence". 98 It is difficult to understand why this 
particular matter should be specifically included as an example or what it 
adds to the definition in totality.99 
Other changes include the addition of " ... adequately ... " and" ... or possible 
consequences ... ". in clause I08(2)(b ). 100 Although these changes do not 
add a great deal to the clarity of the current definition, they do perhaps 
indicate a more benevolent attitude to a mentally impaired defendant than the 
97 
98 
99 
100 
CJAB, cl 108(1). 
CJAB, cl 108(2)(d). 
This point was also raised in the Brookbanks submission, above n 92, 2. 
As additions to the current s l 08( 1 )(b ). 
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current section 108(1 )(b ). lt appears that it would support a finding of 
unfitness to stand trial even where an offender was able to adequately 
understand the nature or purpose of the proceedings, but not the possible 
consequences.101 
No explanation is given for the amended format of clause l 08, but the 
obvious conclusion is that the examples in clause 108(2) are intended to 
allow the court more flexibility than it currently has. However, the current 
section 108 is clearly understood by the courts and appears to have caused 
little problem to date. The semantic changes introduced by clause 108 
generally add little to the current definition and have a large potential to 
cause confusion and unnecessary argument. With appropriate amendments to 
the terminology, the current section 108 could continue to be used. The 
proposed definition has the potential to upset a settled area of the law, and it 
would perhaps be appropriate to reconsider the drafting of this clause before 
it passes into law. 
5 Disposition 
The current regime has led to intellectually disabled offenders being 
inappropriately placed in psychiatric hospitals. The CJAB aims to overcome 
]01 Although the chance of this happening in practice seems remote. 
42 
this problem through the introduction of new dispositions, principally m 
clause 115A: 102 
115A. Detention of defendant found unfit to stand trial ... as ... special 
care recipient - (1) When the court has sufficient information on the 
condition of a defendant found unfit to stand trial ... the court must-
(a) Consider all the circumstances of the case; and 
(b) Consider the evidence of l or more health assessors as to 
whether the detention of the defendant in accordance with 1 of the orders 
specified in subsection (2) is necessary; and 
( c) Make 1 of the orders referred to in paragraph (b) if it is 
satisfied that the making of the order is necessary in the interests of the 
public or any person or class of person who may be affected by the court's 
decision. 
(2) The orders referred to in subsection (1) are that the defendant be 
detained-
(a) ... 
(b) In a secure facility as a special care recipient under the 
Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care) Act 1999_ l 03 
Provision is made for the assessment of a defendant by a health assessor.104 
This clause appears to solve the dispositional problem, but has been criticised 
on the basis that "health assessor" is not defined, 105 and therefore no account 
is taken of the different skills required in dealing with intellectually disabled 
102 
103 
104 
LOS 
CJAB, cl 11 SB offers an alternative disposition of intellectually disabled offenders as 
"civil care recipients" under the ID(CC)B. Many of the considerations discussed with 
regard to cl 11 SA apply equally to cl 11 SB. 
If the court is not satisfied that such an order is necessary, it must make an order 
under CJAB, cl 11 SB. 
CJAB, cls121 to 123. 
See generally Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists "Oral 
Submission : Criminal Justice Amendment Bill (No 7)" 3. 
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and mentally disordered offenders. 106 The concern is that an inappropriately 
qualified assessor may be used. Despite this criticism, the clause clearly 
makes provision for the appropriate disposition of intellectually disabled 
offenders found unfit to stand trial.107 
B The Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care) Bill 
The true test of the proposed regime for the intellectually disabled offender 
will be in the effectiveness of the dispositions under the ID(CC)B. The 
ID(CC)B is a complex108 and completely new piece of proposed legislation. 
lt mirrors the MH(CAT)A92 in providing for compulsory intervention where 
an inte11ectually disabled person refuses to voluntarily accept care or is found 
"unfit to stand trial". Perhaps predictably, the ID(CC)B attracted a far greater 
number of submissions than the CJAB, 109 with the overwhelming criticism 
relating to the powers of "civil" compulsory care and the infringement of 
human rights. 110 However, some submissions did welcome the new Bill, 
particularly in the criminal context. 111 There is no escape from the fact that 
this Bill is controversial. 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
11 I 
A psychologist would be appropriate for the former, a psychiatrist for the latter. 
The question of how effective the "care" regime will be in practice is one that 
obviously remains open. Only when the system is operational will its success (or 
otherwise) be known. 
Consisting of l 83 clauses. 
A totaJ of 66. 
See generally the submissions of the Human Rights Commission "Submission of the 
Human Rights Commission on: The Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care) Bill". 
The matter was aJso the subject of vigorous debate in Parliament: see for example 
the speech of Jenny Bloxham (5 October 1999) 580 ZPD 19700. Many of the 
concerns expressed are equaJly applicable to offenders. 
For example, the Howard League". . . fully support the development of stand-aJone 
legislation to address the needs of those intellectually disabled people who commit 
criminaJ offences": The Howard League for Penal Reform "Submission to HeaJth 
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I Definition of "intellectual disability" 
The entry point to the TD(CC)B is through the definition of "intellectua] 
disability". Although in the context of the CJAB reliance will be on "mental 
impairment", the court wi11 stil1 need to consider whether that impairment is 
in fact an intellectual disability. 
The prob]em with any definition of inte11ectual disability lies: "in providing a 
definition which will have meaning for both the legal and medical 
professions". 112 This difficuJty is reflected in the decision of the New 
Zealand courts. For example, in Police v M (No 2), l l3 the court had to face 
the problem of deaJing with an inte11ectual1y disabled defendant. The 
judgment highlights the differences between the medical and legal concepts 
of mental disorder. 114 The evidence of the two psychiatrists was that: "a 
patient might be considered to be mentally disordered within s2 if the patient 
had a known psychiatric illness which could be treated". 11 5 Judge Boshier 
rejected this finding as not being within the "pure meaning" of the section 2 
definition and he]d that mentally disabled persons are not excluded: 116 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
even though they may not be treatable patients within recognised branches 
of psychiatry. If such persons have an abnormal state of mind, and the other 
criteria in the definition apply, they are by definition mentally disordered . 
Select Committee on Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care) Bill" 1. 
Bernadette McSherry "A Review of the new South Wales Law Reform 
Commission's Report People with an Intellectual Disability and the Criminal Justice 
System" (1999) 25 Monash ULR 166, 168. 
Police v M (No 2), above n 54 
Police v M (No 2), above n 54, 392. 
Police v M (No 2), above n 54, 392 . 
Police vM (No 2), above n 54, 393 . 
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The Judge, like Judge McElrea in R v T, relied on the objective meaning of 
"abnormal" to arrive at this conclusion, but was critical of the regime: "I do 
not think that the mental health definition of "mentally disordered" fits at all 
comfortably with an inquiry initiated through the Criminal Justice Act 
1985". 117 
The drafters of the ID(CC)B attempt to overcome this problem m future 
through the following definition: 118 
117 
118 
20. Meaning of "intellectual disability" - (1) A person has an intellectual 
disability if the person has a permanent impairment that-
(a) Results in significantly sub-average general intelligence as 
measured by standard psychometric tests generally used by clinicians; and 
(b) Results in significant deficits, as measured by tests 
generally used by clirucians, in at least 2 of the skills listed in subsection (3); 
and 
( c) Became apparent during the developmental period of the 
person. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (l)(a), and intelligence quotient of 
70 or less is indicative of significantly sub-average general intelligence. 
(3) The skills referred to in subsection (l)(b) are [concerned with day-
to-day living] 
( 4) For the purposes of subsection (I)( c ), the developmental period of 
a person generally finishes when the person turns 18 years. 
Police v M (No 2), above n 54, 393 . 
This definition is based on the 1992 American Association for Mental Retardation 
definition: ID(CC)B, explanatory note, v. 
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This section is subject to clause 21, which provides that a person does not 
have an intellectual disability simply because of a mental disorder or because 
he or she does not feel shame or remorse about harm they have caused to 
others. 
The intention of the drafters was to provide consistency with the standard 
clinical definitions, and to be of use in a legal context. However, it is 
interesting to contrast this comprehensive definition with that recommended 
by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission:119 
"Intellectual disability" means a significantly below average intellectual 
functioning, existing concurrently with two or more deficits in adaptive 
behaviour. 
Both definitions are intended to achieve the same effect in fitness to plead 
proceedings, 120 and the fact remains that both definitions will be interpreted 
by the courts on the basis of expert evidence. It is realistic to expect a similar 
outcome no matter which definition is used. The more thorough ID(CC)B 
definition in effect only codifies what an expert witness would consider in 
any event. 
One significant difference between the Australian and New Zealand 
definitions is the deliberate omission of the requirement that the disability 
became apparent during the "developmental period". 121 The Australian 
version omitted this requirement to allow the inclusion of disabilities that 
manifest after the age of 18 years. This would have the effect of including 
119 
]20 
121 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 19, 64-65. 
Although it should be noted that the ID(CC)B also applies to civil care recipients. 
This perhaps explains the need for greater complexity. 
Clause 20(1)(c), 20(4). 
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brain damage acquired in later life or dementia. The explanatory note to the 
ID(CC)B clearly sets out that such disabilities are to be excluded from what 
would otherwise appear to fall squarely within the meaning of "mental 
impairment": l 22 
The bill does not apply to-
Persons whose intellectual impairment has been caused by some event after 
the developmental period (18 years or older). 
The reason for this exclusion is not given m the explanatory note, and 
appears to contradict the reason for not defining "mental impairment" so that: 
"the courts are free to interpret the term in line with the overall purpose of 
ensuring procedural faimess"_ 123 
It is difficult to reconcile this statement with the specific exclusion of those 
with an intellectual disability caused after the developmental period. The 
relative simplicity and flexibility of the Australian definition appears 
preferable. It gives the court the power to interpret the term to ensure 
procedural fairness. This is a sensible approach. The court will be in the best 
position to consider the circumstances of a particular case and make its 
decision on the basis of expert evidence. Expert evidence will, by its very 
nature, be highly likely to rely on current trends in diagnosing and dealing 
with intellectual disability. To define the disability so closely risks it 
remaining in force despite possible major shifts in the view of professionals 
dealing with intellectual disability. Amendment would be unlikely to occur to 
keep pace, as is evident from the current reliance on "mental disorder". 
122 
123 
ID(CC)B, explanatory note, iii . 
ID(CC)B, explanatory note, vi 
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For the purposes of a fitness to stand trial hearing in New Zealand, the 
reliance on an undefined "mental impairment" suggests that a much wider 
interpretation of intellectual disability is possible, and that an intellectually 
disabled offender not falling strictly within the clause 20 definition could still 
be found unfit to stand trial. This may lead to confusion in practice. For 
example, in appropriate circumstances the court could include an 
intellectually disabled offender with an IQ of more than 70 by finding them 
to be mentally impaired, although not intellectually disabled. This appears to 
render the careful definition of "intellectual disability" virtually pointless for 
the purposes of finding a defendant unfit to stand trial. 124 
A number of submissions to the Health Committee also criticised this 
definition. It is particularly interesting to note that both legal and mental 
health professionals agree that the term is not "an absolute concept", l25 and 
referred to the difficulties the Victorian Supreme Court experienced in 
interpreting a similar definition of "intellectual disability", particularly with 
regard to the requirement of an IQ of below 70_ 126 
lt is clear even at this stage that the definition of "intellectual disability" is 
one which will cause problems to the courts if it is not amended to allow a 
greater degree of interpretive flexibility. However, it is gratifying to note that 
124 
125 
126 
Although it would still apply in the civil context. 
Mental Health Commission "Submission on the Intellectual Disability (Compulsory 
Care) Bill" 6; New Zealand Law Society Family Law Section "Submissions on the 
Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care) Bill" 1. 
Clancy v Director-General of the Department of Comm11nHy Services, Victoria 
[I 994] I VR 45. 
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the proposed regime applying to intellectually disabled defendants appears to 
no longer require the irrelevant consideration of "dangerousness"_ 127 
2 Definition of "special care recipient" "secure facility" 
Where an intel1ectually disabled offender is found unfit to stand trial, the 
court may dispose of that person as a "special care recipient" in a "secure 
facility". 128 
The lD(CC)B adds little to the meaning of "special care recipient" defining it 
as (including) a person found unfit to stand trial and subject to an order under 
clause 115A of the CJAB. 129 More interestingly, a "secure facility" is defined 
as a facility that: 130 
(a) Has particular features that are designed to prevent persons required to 
stay in the facility from leaving the facility without authority; and 
(b) Is operated in accordance with systems that are designed to achieve that 
purpose. 
A "facility" is: 131 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
[A] place that is used by a service for the purpose of providing care to 
persons who have an intellectual disability (whether or not the place is also 
used for other purposes) . 
This issue was criticised above in relation to the current regime. However, the 
reference in CJAB, cl 11 SA( l )( c) to the " ... interests of the public or any person or 
class of person .. . " may suggest the contrary will apply in practice. The reference to 
dangerousness in the ID(CC)B appears in isolation and will logically apply only to 
those entering the system through the "civil" route: ID(CC)B, cl 19. 
CJAB, cl l 15A(2)(b) 
ID(CC)B, cl 18(3)(a) 
ID(CC)B, cl 22(2) 
ID(CC)B, cl 22(1) 
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All that can be said for sure is that a prison is not a facility.132 
It is these definitions that hold the key to solving the dispositional problem 
that has troubled both the courts and the health system for so many years. A 
"secure facility" is defined widely enough to include virtually anything that is 
secure and not a prison. The only other requirement is the provision of 
"care". "Care" includes the preparation of a "care plan" which a1lows for a 
great deal of discretion. For example, a "care plan" need only identify: 133 
[T]he extent to which, and the manner in which, the needs [ of the proposed 
care recipient] can be met. 
It is quite conceivable that costs or staffing issues will dictate that a 
psychiatric hospital will suffice. Submissions to the Health Committee have 
recognised: "[the] pressing need for the development of adequate services 
and skills to meet the needs of those with ... intellectual disability", 134 and 
that the Bill "makes no provision for the running of facilities, nor does it 
impose on the owners/operators of those facilities any legally enforceable 
responsibilities" . 135 This is reinforced by the definition of "service" as: 136 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
[A]n organisation that provides services for person who have an intellectual 
disability (whether or not ii also provides services for persons who do not 
have an intellectual disability) . (Italics added). 
ID(CC)B, cl 22(3) 
ID(CC)B, cl 55(2) 
Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists "[Submission on] 
Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care) BilJ" 3 
New Zealand Law Society "Submissions on the Intellectual Disability (Compulsory 
Care) Bill" 4. 
ID(CC)B, cl 17. 
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This definition of "service" appears to have its roots in the New Zealand Law 
Commission's 1994 report:137 
Given New Zealand's small population and the desirability of keeping people 
near their own communities and families where possible, it is probably 
inevitable that existing psychiatric hospitals and hospitals for the 
intellectually handicapped will continue to play a role in suppling the 
learning, security and other needs of dangerous intellectually handicapped 
people. Settings could therefore include psychiatric hospitals . .(Italics 
added) 
After the long struggle to finally gain recognition of the differences between 
mental disorder and intellectual disability, and the move towards 
deinstitutionalisation, it would be a disaster to revert to the days when New 
Zealand incarcerated its intellectually disabled citizens in psychiatric 
institutions as a means of "social control". Only the terminology will have 
changed. There must be dedicated facilities for the care of intellectually 
disabled defendants found unfit to stand trial. The definition of "service" 
should recognise this by specifically excluding psychiatric units. 
V CONCLUSION 
The conclusion of this paper is that the current fitness to plead regime clearly 
fails to take account of the needs of intellectually disabled defendants . 
However, the proposed regime specifically addresses these problems and, 
assuming adequate funding and other resources, is likely to provide an 
appropriate remedy. 
137 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 15, 52. 
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The current problems have arisen primarily through Parliament's failure to 
make appropriate amendments to the CJA85 at the same time as the 
MH(CAT)A92 was passed. The crucial failures of the CJA85/MH(CAT)A92 
regime may be distilled into two areas. First, intellectually disabled 
defendants are treated as "mentally disordered" by the criminal courts for the 
purposes of the CJA85. Although this enables the courts to ensure procedural 
fairness, by finding such defendants to be "under disability" and therefore not 
required to stand trial, it avoids the fact that this group is clearly excluded by 
section 4( e) of the MH(CA T)A92. This leads to the second problem, namely 
that the dispositional options available to the courts are manifestly 
inappropriate. As argued in this paper, disposition of intellectually disabled 
defendants to psychiatric institutions as "special patients" does no service to 
society or the defendant. The result of such dispositions is merely to delay 
the inevitable. The "patient" will be discharged following the first review. 
They are simply not "mentally disordered" nor are they susceptible to the 
"treatment" envisaged by the MH(CA T)A92. 
New legislation is the only realistic remedy to the current problems. 
Parliament's answer has been through the introduction of two new Bills, the 
CJAB and the JD(CC)B. The CJAB totally overhauls Part VII of the CJA85. 
It also introduces a requirement that the court is satisfied the defendant was 
involved in the offence. This reflects the overseas approach and provides a 
further procedural safeguard for the defendant. Significantly, the CJAB also 
replaces the problematic term "mental disorder", with the undefined 
"intellectual impairment". This new term has been subject to criticism, 
particularly with regard to the interpretation the courts may place upon it. 
However, for the purposes of this paper, it is inconceivable that the courts 
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would interpret it to exclude intellectually disabled defendants. A new 
definition of "intellectual disability" has been included in the ID(CC)B 
which, although subject to criticism, reflects the definition generally adopted 
by health professionals. This definition appears to be divorced from the 
irrelevant consideration of "dangerousness" that persists in the MH(CAT)A92 
definition of "mental disorder". Other changes to section 108, however, have 
the potential to confuse the clearly understood considerations as to what is 
required for a finding of "under disability". 
The dispositional options available to the courts have been widened by the 
CJAB to include orders under the new "sister" Act to the MH(CAT)A92, the 
ID(CC)B. Although the ID(CC)B has been criticised for its complexity it 
wi11, if it operates as intended, provide appropriate options to the courts in 
disposing of intellectually disabled defendants found "unfit to stand trail" . 
The caveat is whether the care envisaged under this Bi11 will be funded 
adequately and appropriate staff and facilities provided. If not, then the 
iniquity of using psychiatric units for the "social control" of inte11ectual1y 
disabled defendants will continue. 
Despite the criticisms set out in this paper, the CJAB/ID(CC)B represents a 
great improvement in the fitness to stand trial regime as far as intellectually 
disabled defendants are concerned. The CJAB contains all the elements 
necessary to overcome the definitional problems in the current regime, and 
the ID(CC)B, by providing appropriate dispositional facilities, will remedy 
the downstream problems currently faced by the courts and health services. 
The true test of the proposed regime will, of course, be in its practical 
operation. 
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